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SMART-GRID: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR CHANGE
STEPHANIE M. STERN

INTRODUCTION

There is a growing debate about the capacity of psychological forces,
including social norms, personal values, and information provision, to reduce individual emissions and pollution. One group of scholars has argued
that values, personal norms, social pressure, and information campaigns
can activate and maintain individual pro-environmental behaviors. This
line of research has focused on interventions to activate personal norms and
increase the visibility of household environmental behaviors.2 Other researchers are more pessimistic and contend that cognitive, motivational,
and social forces sharply limit behavioral change, at least for certain subtypes of environmental behaviors that involve large numbers of players and
minimal personal payoffs. 3 They advocate greater use of financial incentives and structural changes that increase the convenience of environmentally-friendly behaviors. 4
Both camps of legal scholarship have neglected the less intellectually
enticing, but in some cases more potent, domain of technology. Indeed, for
* Stephanie Stern is an associate professor of law at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Her research focuses on property law, environmental law, and behavioral law and economics. She wishes to
thank Fred Bosselman, Dan Tarlock, Tom Gaylord, Margaux Birdsall, and Beth Nielson for their
helpful comments on this essay.
1. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 174 (2009) (concluding that despite its costs and fallibilities, norm change is more effective than other means of
producing individual behavior change); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon
Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1673, 1713-1717 (2007) (discussing how the norms of personal
responsibility and carbon neutrality can affect individual and household greenhouse gas emissions); see
also Jed S. Ela, Comment, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 93, 93-94 (2009) (discussing the importance of
social visibility in environmental behavior change).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1231, 1236 (2001) ("Though
social norms can, and sometimes do, play a role in encouraging cooperative behavior to resolve largenumber, small-payoff problems, if recycling is any indication, their force is fairly limited.").
4. See id at 1292-95.
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many environmental behaviors, the scholarly debate may soon be moot.
Technology and automation are poised to reduce both the need for and the
costs of individual behavior modification in many contexts, including residential energy usage. Psychology research has long established that consumer adoption of energy-efficient and pollution-reducing technology has
much greater impact on consumption behavior than psychological and informational interventions. 5 The comparative neglect of technology in the
environmental law scholarship is worrisome: lawyers, policymakers, and
scholars will need to be technology's legal architects and to balance environmental gains against autonomy, property rights, and privacy.
This Essay questions the efficacy of traditional norm change and information provision interventions to reduce pollution from residential electricity consumption. The example of electricity "smart grids" illustrates
how technology engineered to override cognitive and behavioral limitations
can substantially reduce energy consumption and emissions.6 By bringing
into sharper analytical focus what is likely to be effective in households,
smart grid enhances our understanding of the psychology of individual
environmental behavior change and underscores the importance of technology to human behavior. It also increases the common ground between the
optimist and pessimist accounts in the legal scholarship: It is not despite
cognitive and behavioral limitations but because of them-and because of
technology specifically adapted to human limitations-that we are likely to
see major reductions in individual emissions.
In the near future, we may dispense with information pamphlets, slogans to encourage households to turn off lights, energy audits, and the like
in favor of sophisticated default- and preference-setting and integrated
external control of residential electricity. Smart grid is a high-efficiency
infrastructure for electricity transmission and distribution that employs
automated and semi-automated consumption management, integrated
communications, real-time information sharing, and advanced sensor and
measurement technology.7 Smart grid technology automates residential
electricity delivery and appliance cycling based on consumer preferences,

5. See Paul C. Stem & Gerald T. Gardner, Psychological Research & Energy Policy, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 329, 331-34 (1981) (noting the importance of encouraging active conservation behavior
but concluding that the largest gains frequently derive from adoption of efficiency-enhancing technology).
6. See Scott Blake Harris, The SmartGrid Stakeholder Roundtable Group: Perspectives for
Utilities and Others Implementing Smart Grids, in GREEN TECH. LAW & BuS. 2010: LEGIS., FIN.,
CARBON TRADING & SUSTAINABILITY, 139,147(PLI Corp. Law & Prac., Course Handbook Ser. No
227371785, PLI/CORP 139, 147 (2010).

7. See id.
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grid epergencies, or imminent shortages.8 The technology is capable of
suggesting preferences or setting default preferences for households and
even individual appliances based on profiles of past energy use patterns.9
By reducing the behavioral demand and information load on consumers,
smart grid significantly decreases consumption, particularly peak load
energy use. When smart grid employs less than full technology override, it
is capable of "layering" multiple behavior change mechanisms including
real-time information and immediate feedback, social norm dissemination
through data about others' usage, and incentives from off-peak rate structures (often immediately visible on meters).' 0
A comprehensive smart grid should be available in another decade or
two; even if a national grid fails to emerge, discrete smart grids and smart
grid technology will be prevalent. Individual elements of the smart grid,
such as smart meters, are already in use in some areas.Il In anticipation of
smart grid implementation, there has been an enormous uptick of research
and development and significant lawmaking to fund smart grid planning.
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 created a research,
development, and demonstration program for smart grid technologies and
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provides more than $11
12
billion for research and pilot projects.
For households and individual polluters, smart grid illustrates technology's key role in collective action problems where comprehensive pollution-reduction is "high behavioral demand" and requires frequent (often
daily) action and ongoing vigilance across multiple contexts. In the legal
scholarship, Ann Carlson has questioned the efficacy of social norm and
other psychological manipulations in "lar e-number, small-payoff' collecThis Essay contributes to this
tive action problems such as recycling.
analysis the concept of high behavioral demand and contends that the barriers described by Carlson intensify when behavior change requires repeated actions across multiple contexts and ongoing cognitive vigilance.

8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See id.
10. Researchers have found that layering multiple interventions substantially increases behavior
change. See Paul C. Stem, Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior, 56 J.
Soc. ISSUES 407, 419 (2000) ("By far, the most effective behavior change programs involve combinations of intervention types.").
I1. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, The Smart Grid: An Introduction, at 2.
12. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17381-17382 (Supp. 12007). In
addition, at the state level, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions (NARUC) is
studying and pursuing aspects of smart grid implementation. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, The Smart Grid:
An Introduction,at 26.
13. See Carlson,supra note 3, at 1241--44.
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Further amplifying the barriers to change, psychologists have found that
behavior perceived as ongoing deprivation or "constant curtailment" is the
most resistant to modification.
In the context of residential electricity, not only is usage widespread
(rather than emerging in a tight-knit community) and the payoff from reduction modest or moderate, the frequency and intensity of behavioral demand is often steep. To reduce electricity usage comprehensively,
individuals must complete high-frequency behaviors (e.g., turning off or
cycling down) across multiple household appliances, process complex information, and continuously monitor usage. Of course, not every household
conservation behavior is high cost. For example, switching to highefficiency light bulbs and resetting hot-water heaters are comparatively
simple and infrequent behaviors. However, even in these instances the low
rate of action suggests barriers to behavior change.
Automation and semi-automation are critically useful for household
environmental behaviors subject to multiple barriers to behavior change:
high numbers, modest payoffs, low visibility, and, in particular, high behavioral demand. Automated technology may be especially useful for private
behaviors, such as electricity use within the home, where there is low visibility and a strong sense of personal prerogative.15 Greater reliance on automation, even at some expense to individual autonomy, takes previous
calls in the environmental law literature for restructuring behavioral "architecture" several steps further.16 Technological automation and semiautomation move convenience to the (controversial) level of control. And
there is no more comprehensive example of architectural overhaul than a
fully integrated, national smart grid.
This Essay employs the example of smart grid to assess the merits of
technology and automation as compared to traditional norm activation and
information campaigns. Part I of the Essay provides an overview of the
envisioned smart grid as well as smart technologies already in use. Part II
argues that in light of the specific characteristics of residential energy
14. See generally Stem & Gardner, supra note 5.
15. See generally Stephanie M. Stem, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of
Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009) (describing the cultural importance attributed to control over the
home and the impact on laws regulating dispossession); Jed S. Ela, Comment, Law and Norms in
Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 93, 117-18 (2009)at (describing the importance of behavioral visibility and concluding that
resources should be directed to more visible environmental behaviors and to raising the visibility of
private actions).
16. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 661, 662-63 (1998);
Carlson, supra note 3, at 1253-54 (expanding Lessig's description of architecture and applying it to
personal recycling).
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usage, automation and technological innovation warrant greater attention
by scholars. Specifically, I contend that automation and technology are
better suited than single-process behavioral interventions to address residential electricity collective action problems entailing high-frequency, costly, and varied behavioral demands. Part III considers the potential of smart
grid to circumvent traditional barriers to reducing household electricity. In
this part, I raise-though do not resolve-some of the complex legal issues
at stake in balancing personal autonomy and pollution-reducing automation.
I.

SMART GRID AND THE RESIDENTIAL HOUSEHOLD

Smart grid is an integrative technology that seeks to optimize electricity transmission and distribution, increase efficiency, and expand the use of
information technology and two-way communication between the consumer and utility.17 This electrical "super-highway" of the near future envisions
electricity delivery across extra high voltage transmission lines that increase efficiency and dramatically reduce the power line footprint. Smart
grid incorporates technologies such as consumer "smart meters" (which are
already in use in some areas), sophisticated consumer preference-setting,
and master control of electricity distribution.' 9
A.

Smart Grid's Environmental and Efficiency Gains

Because electricity must be consumed when generated, producing the
right supply of electricity based on comprehensive, real-time demand information is critical to energy efficiency. Electricity generation is responsible for forty percent of all carbon dioxide emissions, making this sector a
major contributor to global warming and its associated environmental
harms.21 High-polluting, coal-burning power plants are the source of over
one-half of all electricity generated in the United States.22 Smart grid reduces pollution by decreasing both the amount of electricity consumed and
the amount lost in transmission.23 To put the potential carbon savings in
17. See Harris,supra note 6, at 147.
18. See Joseph P. Tomain, "Steel in the Ground:" Greening the Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL.

L. 931, 934 (2009).
19. See Harris,supranote 6, at 149-150.
20. See id. at 13-14.
21. See id at 20. One study found that in 2000, each person in the United States on average was
responsible for 1,922 pounds of carbon dioxide emissions. See Michael P. Vandenbergy & Anne C.
Steinemann, The CarbonNeutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 119 (2007).
22. See Tomain, supranote 18, at 931.
23. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 11, at 20.
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context, a five percent increase in electricity grid efficiency is equivalent to
24
eliminating greenhouse gas emissions from 53 million cars.
Smart grid enables utilities to increase energy efficiency through enhanced load control capabilities and reduced losses across the transmission
and distribution grids. 5 In particular, more sophisticated deployment of
electricity reduces peak load provision (typically during the morning and
then late afternoon to evening) and thus the use of high-polluting "peaker
plants" which come online during these demand windows.26 A fullyfunctioning smart grid also reduces integration costs for renewable technologies (e.g., solar sources), powers plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles
on a national scale, and enables "net metering" where customers can sell
excess electricity back to the utility.27 Other mechanisms for increasing
energy efficiency include intelligent substations that improve supplydemand matching by providing utilities more real-time information, energy
storage devices that enable electricity deployment during peak demand, and
more widely distributed Aeneration controls that allow customer-owned
distribution or mini-grids. Smart grid also increases reliability and reduces outages through better control of distribution, phasor measurement units
that sample voltage and current many times per second, and the capacity to
"self-heal" the grid. 29
Notably, the transition to smart grid will not be costless. Smart grid is
likely to increase electricity bills for consumers, at least in the short-term,
to recoup infrastructure costs.30 However, absent a move to smart grid, our
aging and inefficient electricity infrastructure, created before the age of
microprocessors, will soon require major upgrading or overhaul. As a
result of population growth, larger houses, and more power-intensive electronics and appliances, transmission growth has lagged behind electricity
24. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 11, at 7.

25. See id. at 1-12,29,33.
26. See id at 13.
27. See Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate New
Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 993-94 (2009) (discussing issues integrating
unpredictable renewable power flow into traditional grids).
28. See Harris,supra note 6, at 151-53, 155.
29. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing phasor measurement units).
30. For example, for a city of one million people a complete smart grid system is forecast to cost
one billion dollars. See OFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS' COUNSEL, CONSUMERS FACT SHEET, AN
INTRODUCTION TO SMART GRID 4 (2010) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE OHIO]. Even with more limited
implementation, such as smart metering only, consumer costs may increase. One smart metering program in Bakersfield, California resulted in bill increases and a subsequent lawsuit. See MacKinnon
Lawrence, Bringing the Smart Grid Home: Will Consumers Opt-in?, CLEAN TECHIES BLOG (June 8,
2010,
8:00
AM),
http://blog.cleantechies.com/2010/06/22/bringing-the-smart-grid-home-willconsumers-opt-in.
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 11, at 2, 6, 18.
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demand every year since 1982.32 Moreover, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration predicts that electricity demand will increase thirty percent
over 2008 levels by 2035.33 The deployment of a national smart grid could
reduce electricity demand by as much as thirty-eight to forty-eight percent. 34 In the long-term, smart grid will save consumers money by avoiding ineffective and expensive piecemeal repair of an antiquated
infrastructure. Smart grid will also reduce residential electricity consumption substantially so long as households don't "take back" efficiency gains
by increasing usage or purchasing more energy-intensive electronics. If
consumer take-back occurs, smart grid is more adept than traditional infrastructure at mitigation through pricing, external grid control, more sophisticated appliance cycling, and lower default consumption settings. 35
B.

Residential Electricity:Bringing Smart Grid Home

A major focus of the current discussion and debate regarding smart
grid is its application to residential consumers.36 Residential smart grid
technology utilizes advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), which encompasses smart meters and smart appliances.37 Advanced metering infrastructure communicates real-time price signals to residential smart home
controllers or appliances.38 These devices then power according to the
technology's "learned" preferences (i.e., a profile based on past use), default settings, or settings selected by the consumer. 39 As the U.S. Department of Energy notes, "[b]ecause this interaction occurs largely 'in the
background' with minimal human intervention, there's a dramatic savings
on energy that would otherwise be consumed." 40
Smart meters provide consumers with real-time or near real-time information about energy usage.41 They can also be utilized to allow consumers to "pre-commit" to operating appliances or consuming higher levels
32. See id. at 6.
33. See OFFICE OF THE OHIO, supra note 30, at 2.
34. See Marc W. Chupka et al., TransformingAmerica's Power Industry: The Investment Challenge 2010-2030, THE BRATTLE GROUP 19 (Nov. 2008),
http://www.brattle.com/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload725.pdf. See Marc W. Chupka et al., Transforming America's PowerIndustry: The Investment Challenge 2010-2030, at 19 (2008), availableat
http://www.brattle.con/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload725.pdf
35. See id. at 6, 37
36. See id at 10-11.
37. Id. at 11.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 14, 41.
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of electricity during times when energy demand and cost are lower.42 One
Department of Energy Demonstration project on the Olympic Peninsula
found that delivering electricity based on the consumer's preset preference
profile saved consumers ten percent on their bills and reduced peak load by
fifteen percent. 43 Several cities have made or are making major investments
in smart meters, including Miami's recent 200 million dollar investment in
smart meters, Cincinnati's installation of 30,000 smart meters, and plans in
Califomia to install a total of 9.8 million smart meters in the northern and
central parts of the state.
Smart appliances communicate directly with the grid and enable utilities to cycle individual household appliances on and off. Smart appliances
are also able to receive price signals about peak rates and remain on but
automatically shift into a reduced electricity usage or conservation mode
(e.g., clothes dryer will take longer to dry but the appliance is not cycled
off entirely and the consumer receives discounted pricing).4 5 Currently,
early prototypes of smart appliances are beginning to become available on
the market, with General Electric recently launching consumer energy
communication devices.46 External control of smart appliances may occur,
in theory, with or without consumer permission or may utilize a middleground approach where consumers complete preference-settings that subsequently control their appliances. The differential in rate structures for
peak/off-peak, coupled with initial consumer costs from smart grid infrastructure, may mean that many consumers opt for large amounts of automated cycling-a good result from the standpoint of consumer behavior
change and environmental protection. 47
Instead of relying solely on automation, residential smart grid technologies can also utilize semi-automation and layered behavior change
interventions to encourage households to voluntarily reduce consumption.
For example, smart technologies can provide real-time cost feedback, environmental impact information, and even peer usage benchmarks. The smart
grid can send customers price signals in order to address short-term power
supply imbalances or potential grid emergencies and enable consumers to

42. See Harris, supranote 6, at 159.
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 11, at 30.
44. See Ariel Schwartz, One Million Smart Meters for Energy-Smart Miami Program, April 20,
2009, available at http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/ariel-schwartz/sustainability/1-million-smartmeters-energy-smart-miami-program; OFFICE OF THE OHIO supranote 30, at 1, 45.
45. See Martin LaMonica, Are Consumers Ready for the Smart Grid?, CNET News (July 15,
2009) 2, http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10287240-54.htmi.
46. See id. at 1.
47. See Harris, supranote 6, at 156.
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sell energy back to the grid. 48 Price information is most helpful when utilities amplify the price signal to the consumer by "decoupling" the infrastructure and fixed costs from the volume of electricity sales. 49 While
some degree of automation or a combination of automation and pricing
appear most effective, information about energy usage and environmental
impacts as well as non-monetary incentives also have a role (especially
when automation is unavailing or normatively undesirable).
II. PSYCHOLOGY OF INDIVIDUAL ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR CHANGE:
MOVING TOWARD AUTOMATION "NORMS"

Psychologists and engineers have long recognized the primacy of
technology to environmental behavior change. Legal scholarship, on the
other hand, has focused disproportionately on altering norms and inculcating civic virtue. There has been an ongoing debate in the legal scholarship
about whether-or in what circumstances-norm, value, and awarenessraising initiatives can form the basis of successful environmental reform. 50
To the extent this debate marches on, it is beginning to sound a little dated.
Moreover, this framing of the issue has led to the comparative neglect of
automation and technology as behavior change agents. 5 '
This Essay contends that the sizeable barriers to behavior change require a stronger focus on automation and technology to address residential
electricity consumption. This approach prioritizes technological investment
and development where possible. It emphasizes technology adoption and
consumer usage setting rather than day-to-day environmental behavior
modification. Financial incentives and information may be part of this approach, but not its sum total. 52

48. See Amy Westervelt, The Smart Grid is Dumb Without Smart Consumers, SOLVE CLIMATE
NEWS (March 23, 2010) 1-2 http://solveclimate.com/blog/20100323/smart-grid-dumb-without-smartconsumers (citing internal IBM study).
49. See Tomain, supra note 18, at 960-61.
50. See generally supranotes 1-4.
51. Many accounts of individual energy use do not consider at all (or consider only peripherally)
technology and automation. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Using Economics to Fuel Responsible Energy
Consumption Decisions, 38 ENVTL. L.REP. 10842, 10842 (2008) (noting that policymakers should take
advantage of regulatory standards, taxes, incentives, and informational remedies to address individual
energy consumption).
52. Financial incentives entail ongoing costs and must be set at high levels to provoke substantial
behavior change. See Richard A. Winett & Michael T. Nietzel, Behavioral Ecology: Contingency
Management of Consumer Energy Use, 3 AM. J. CMTY. PSYCHOL. 123, 129 (1975) (significant economic incentives reduced household electricity consumption by fifteen percent); cf Steven C. Hayes & John
D. Cone, Reduction of Residential Consumption of Electricity Through Simple Monthly Feedback, 14 J.
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 81, 85-88 (1981) (thirty percent reduction in electricity use in response to
cash rebates).
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A.

Cognitive andBehavioral Constraints

Changing environmental behavior with information provision or
norm-change interventions is a difficult and resource-intensive process.53
Research findings illustrate the challenges of behavior change, particularly
absent face-to-face interaction and social visibility. As one researcher observes, "marketing a behavior is . . . very different than marketing a prod-

uct. Traditional marketing approaches, which tend to target attitudes, have
had some success in raising levels of awareness and concern, but have a
poor track record when it comes to promoting behavior change." 54 For
behavior change to occur, consumers must have the right information, possess or adopt consonant norms and values (or receive financial incentives),
translate those motivations into action, and maintain behavior change over
time.ss These are steep barriers and even scholars who are optimistic about
behavior change and "environmental republicanism" have found that theoretical aspirations often break down in implementation. 56
Residential energy use is a paradigm of the barriers to behavior
change. Much has been written about the deleterious effects of large numbers, minimal payoffs, loose or non-existent social ties, and lack of public
visibility on cooperation. 5 7 Scholars such as Elinor Ostrom have devoted
decades to studying cooperation to resolve environmental and natural resource commons problems.58 Ann Carlson has written persuasively about
the inability of social norms to resolve collective actions problems such as
recycling that involve large numbers of players and small payoffs. 5 9 Electricity conservation is vulnerable to similar obstacles. Electricity usage is
widespread, dispersed, and private, occurring in virtually all households in
the United States. The payoffs from conservation are modest because elec53. The high-cost nature is evident in initiatives focused on both personal contact and financial
incentives. Fac- to-face contact to change behavior is inherently expensive. The research on financial
incentives, at least in the household energy sector, has shown that incentives typically need to be substantial to provoke significant behavior change. See Paul C. Stem, Blind Spots in Policy Analysis: What
Economics Doesn't Say About Energy Use, 5 J. POLIC'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 200, 210-11 (1986).
54. See Amanda R. Carrico et al., Energy and Climate Change: Key Lessonsfor Implementing the
Behavioral Wedge, 2 J. ENERGY AND ENvTL. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2010).
55. See id.
56. See Hope M. Babcock, Responsible Environmental Behavior, Energy Conservation, and
Compact Fluorescent Bulbs: You can Lead a Horse to Water, But Can You Make It Drink?, 37
HOFSTRA L. REv. 943, 946 (2009) ("Somewhat to my surprise, and perhaps to the surprise of anyone
who has read my previous work in this area, this Article reaches the conclusion that the perceived
problems with CFLs (compact fluorescent light bulbs) are sufficiently severe that no amount of persuasion will induce individuals to acquire them, despite their individual and social benefits.").
57. See generally supra notes 1-3.
58. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).

59. See Carlson,supra note 3, at 1241-44.
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tricity has historically been underpriced relative to its environmental
costs. 60 In addition to these structural impediments, there are behavioral,
cognitive, and cultural stumbling blocks to changing household energy
consumption.
First, motivational deficits arise from faulty risk assessment.61 There
is significant evidence that people apply inaccurate discount rates and fail
to recognize the long-term savings and value from conserving energy or
investing in energy-efficient technology.62 Experts estimate the discount
rate of greenhouse gas emissions between three and seven percent; individual consumers display "temporal myopia" and on average employ a discount of over thirty percent when they consider future energy cost savings
(both social and private). 63 Diminished risk perception is due to knowledge
deficits and uncertainty about global warming outcomes as well as a lack of
People experience
personal experience with climate change impacts.
climate change risk as distant and hypothetical and process that risk analytically.65 In contrast, direct, personal experience with outcomes activates
emotional and affective processing which is automatic, fast, and robust
(sometimes too much so). 66 Compared to affective processing, analytic
processing significantly decreases perceptions of risk.
Second, information costs are high for households. Most people have
limited knowledge of the amount of electricity they consume in daily life,
its environmental impact, or how to reduce usage. In general, research
shows that individuals have difficulty gathering, understanding, attending
to, and retaining information, particularly material that is technical, com-

60. See David P. Spence, Coal-FiredPower in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 187, 191-192 (2005) (describing how the "remarkably stable and low" price of
coal-fired electricity does not reflect the social and environmental costs of its generation).
61. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 1472 (1998).
62. See Viscusi, supranote 51, at 10843.
63. Id.
64. See A Report by the American Psychology Association's Task Force on the Interface Between
Psychology and Global Climate Change, Psychology and Global Climate Change: Addressing a MultiFaceted
Phenomenon
and
Set
of Challenges
34,
125
(2009),
available at
http://www.apa.org/science/about/publications/climate-change.pdf
65. See id. at 34.
66. See generally SHELLY CHAIKEN & YAAKOV TROPE, DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1999) (describing affective and cognitive modes of decision making and problemsolving).
67. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as a Feeling, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 274 (2001)
("Behavioral evidence suggests that, to the extent that emotional reactions to, and cognitive evaluations
of, risky choice options are dissociated, risk preference is often determined by the former.").
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plex, or low-interest.68 In studies of household energy, researchers have
found that most individuals don't understand which actions to take to effectively reduce consumption.69 Compounding these deficits, residential electricity consumption takes multiple forms in households, many of which are
not salient (e.g., leaving appliances plugged in when not in use).
Third, knowledge, motivation, and even specific intentions do not
translate readily or reliably into behavior change. Even if motivation is
properly inculcated, there is evidence that (even minute behavioral change
often fails to occur in the face of supportive attitudes. For example, studies evaluating the effects of awareness-raising provision of energy conservation information (as opposed to personalized feedback) have found that
these initiatives increase knowledge but have "minimal effects on behavior." 71 Time, money, infrastructure, household needs, and other contextual
factors constrain household energy consumption and dampen the influence
of values, beliefs, and norms. 72 Culture also constrains behavior change:
American consumerism encourages large houses and myriad electronics
and a pliances without equivalent value placed on thrift and conservation. Over time, socially-ingrained consumption behaviors take root as
personal habits.74
In the absence of incentives or strong intrinsic motivation, behavioral
costs must be low to ensure pro-environmental action. One need only look
at the amount of litter on streets with garbage cans on every block to realize
that even low levels of behavioral cost often prevent socially beneficial
actions. 75 Even if a behavior is established, it is difficult to maintain over
time. If a behavior does not become a habit or automatic response, then
68. See A Report by the American Psychology Association's Task Force on the Interface Between
Psychology and Global Climate Change, supra note 64, at 123 (describing how individuals lack knowledge both about climate change and about which personal actions to take to reduce emissions).
69. See Willett Kempton et al., Do Consumers Know "What Works" in Energy Conservations, 9
MARRJAGE FAM. REV. 115, 131 (1985).
70. See, e.g. Tanya Domina & Kathryn Koch, Convenience and Frequency ofRecycling: Implications for Including Textiles in Curbside Recycling Programs, 34 ENv. & BEHAV. 216, 234 (2002)
(finding the convenience is a key predictor of recycling behavior and mixed results for whether environmental concern mediates recycling behavior).
71. See A Report by the American Psychology Association's Task Force on the Interface Between
Psychology and Global Climate Change, supra note 64, at 146.
72. See J. Stanley Black et al., Personaland Contextual Influences on HouseholdEnergy Adaptation, 70 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 3, 3 (1985) (finding that norms and personal values have a much
smaller effect on constrained activities).
73. See A Report by the American Psychology Association's Task Force on the Interface Between
Psychology and Global Climate Change, supra note 64, at 72-73 (discussing interaction between consumerism and climate change).
74. See A Report by the American Psychology Association's Task Force on the Interface Between
Psychology and Global Climate Change, supra note 64, at 129-130.
75. See Carlson,supra note 3.
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people must direct continual attention and energy to maintaining the behavior. In the absence of habit development or high motivation, proenvironmental behaviors such as energy thrift often do not develop or, if
they do, fade over time. 76
Last, behavior change may be particularly difficult within the residential home. Because domestic behavior is largel' private, it is less susceptible to social norm activation and maintenance. People do not receive the
same social approval and psychological reinforcement for electricity conservation as they do from more public behaviors, such as brandishing reusable canvas bags at the grocery store.7 8 For example, there is evidence that
homeownership increases recycling, presumably in part because homeownership results in longer tenure and thus greater likelihood that neighbors
and community members will recognize the homeowner bringing recycling
to the curb or local drop-off.79 However, it does not follow that proenvironmental actions occurring within the home interior or other private
residential spaces will be similarly forthcoming. To the contrary, the cultural and legal construction of the American home has emphasized dominion, individualism, and private prerogative rather than social
responsibility. It may be the case that people feel particularly at liberty to
satisfy their individual desires and convenience, rather than their environmental responsibilities, within the four walls of the home.
B.

High BehavioralDemand EnvironmentalAction

This Essay seeks to add another dimension to the legal scholarship
discussing the efficacy of environmental behavior change: high behavioral
demand. As I employ this term, high-demand behavior refers to behavior

76. Moreover, habit currently works to the detriment of environmental protection in most households. Many individuals habitually waste energy, over-consume, idle cars, etc. See A Report by the
American Psychology Association's Task Force on the Interface Between Psychology and Global
Climate Change, supra note 64, at 129-30.
77. Homes and similarly exclusive private spaces limit both the social reinforcement of proenvironmental behavior and derision and shaming responses to anti-environmental actions. For a
discussion of this dynamic in the context of residential land conservation incentives, see Stephanie
Stem, Encouraging Conservation on PrivateLands: A BehavioralAnalysis of FinancialIncentives, 48
ARIz. L. REV. 541, 556 (2006).
78. A recent paper argues that public visibility, and thus social influence, are the key predictive
factors in norm change and discusses the difficulty of personal behavior change in low-visibility contexts such as residential energy use. See Jed S. Ela, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing
Social Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLIC'Y 93, 133 (2009).
79. See Domina & Koch, supra note 70, at 218-19 (reviewing research literature finding that
income and homeownership, as well as age, are predictors of recycling behavior).
80. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stem, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 905101, 913-915114-115 (2010).
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that is frequent (often involving many small acts), ongoing, periodic or
constant, and requires action or attention in multiple household contexts.
The concept of high behavioral demand partially intersects with the discussions of convenience in Ann Carlson's work, as well as with the psychological research on the difficulty of "constant curtailment" (i.e., ongoing
restriction or deprivation).81 However, high behavioral demand is broader,
encompassing not only the effects of convenience and perceived deprivation over time, but also the challenges of high-frequency, multi-context
behavior and the cognitive burdens of ongoing vigilance and multi-tasking.
The conceptual focus is on these characteristics as proxies for behavioral
intensity: how costly is pro-environmental behavior to the individual consumer in the currencies of time, energy, and effort.
High-demand behaviors entail frequent, often daily, actions. A unifying characteristic of high-demand behaviors is that they are not "one-shot"
(e.g., setting the water heater temperature), but rather involve repeated
action (e.g., turning off or unplugginE electronics not in use or reducing
consumption during peak load times). Repeated action is costly and typically requires ongoing behavioral reinforcement, whether social, personal,
or monetary.
Of course, not all electricity conservation is behaviorally
demanding: reducing pollution through energy star appliances, for example, requires only a single purchase decision which is often spurred by incentives or information and labeling. However, many other aspects of
residential electricity conservation are not so readily elicited due to their
higher frequency and costs of action.
Typically, high-demand conservation behavior is ongoing and requires
constant, episodic, or periodic action. Behavioral costs are highest when
action is not amenable to habit formation and calls for ongoing cognitive
vigilance due to variable timing or dependence on external factors or cues,
such as changes in pricing. In some instances, such as reducing electricity
consumption from lights and appliances, conservation requires daily behaviors. In other cases, conservation is semi-automated but still necessitates
periodic action (e.g., optimally resetting complicated heating/cooling thermostat models for seasonal changes).

81. See Carlson, supra note 3, at 1265-66. (discussing convenience and "architectural change");
Willett Kempton et al., Psychological Research for the New Energy Problems: Strategies and Opportunities, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1213, 1216-17 (1992) (defining constant curtailment as long-term
changes in behavior that involve giving something up).
82. Smart electrical power strips have come on the market to automatically stop power drain from
electronics not in use. However, these strips still require further work to refine their reliability and to
ensure ease of use and thus widespread adoption.
83. See Kempton, supra note 81, at 1216-17.
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The varying household contexts for electricity conservation also increase behavioral costs. People must not only act frequently and over time
but also act across multiple household domains. Absent a public smart grid
or private computerized smart house system, there is no master control for
consumption. Instead, people must remember to conserve across multiple
appliances, myriad electronics, and different lighting contexts such as indoor and outdoor. Moreover, using electricity-draining appliances less
frequently, decreasing usage during peak load times, and other consumption-reducing behaviors compete with each other and with other personal
and household demands. As a result, individuals often must perform different tasks simultaneously or switch rapidly between tasks. The psychology research illustrates that we are poor multi-taskers: information
processing suffers, rates of error increase, and task completion decreases
when we multi-task. 84
In sum, many aspects of household electricity conservation impose
steep behavioral demands by requiring frequent, ongoing, and multicontext behavior change. Because of these high costs, comprehensively
reducing electricity consumption requires more targeted, sophisticated, and
effective interventions than traditional information and social norm approaches offer.
C. Automation Norms
As a result of the barriers to behavior change, it seems unlikely that
social and psychological interventions can adequately address pollution
problems characterized by loose-knit ties, widespread players, limited financial reward, and as explored in this Essay, high behavioral demand.
Thus, I argue here for a greater emphasis on automation and technology for
residential electricity (and other household pollution problems). This proposal aligns with research showing that at appropriate price points people
greatly prefer to invest in energy-efficient technology rather than change
their daily behaviors and habits. 8 Once an individual adopts higherefficiency technologies environmental benefits accrue automatically and
less painfull Z than with curtailment, which consumers typically perceive as
deprivation.
84. See H. Pashler, Dual-Task-task Interference in Simple Tasks: Data and Theory, 116 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 220, 220 (1994); W.H. Gladstones et al., Divisions of Attention: The Single-Channel Hypothesis
Revisited, 41 Q. J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 12-16 (1989).
85. See generally RAYMOND S. NICKERSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 96

(2003).
86. See Carrico et al., supra note 54, at 4 ("Efficiency improvements generally offer greater longterm potential for reducing energy use and emissions. Once upgraded, savings can be achieved without
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An emphasis on technology development has permeated the history of
environmental law with respect to industrial and corporate polluters. Individuals and households have not been the beneficiaries of a similar technology push, in part because of their large numbers, geographic dispersion,
and lack of technical sophistication. However, smart grid is changing this
dynamic: in the foreseeable future we should be able to deliver advanced
pollution-mitigating technologies to residential consumers nationwide.
Residential smart grid, unlike industrial pollution-control technologies,
does not require expert operators. To the contrary, smart grid capitalizes
upon "bounded rationality" with technology designed specifically to avoid
or mitigate weaknesses in human cognition and behavior.
It is time to reorient household environmental policy (and scholarship)
from educational pamphlets and information disclosures toward a greater
focus on technology. We need a policymaking "norm" in the residential
context, comparable to what exists in the industrial sector, favoring technology as the first-pass solution. Comprehensive pollution reduction in an
era of ever-increasing electricity demand requires the deployment of sophisticated automated and semi-automated technology. Enabling one-time
preference-setting, computer-generated settings, or even limited external
control reduces or eliminates behavioral and cognitive barriers to proenvironmental behavior.
In addition, although a seemingly obvious point, people interact with
technologies. Lest my depiction of the social norms scholarship sound too
cavalier, I note here that the research on environmental values and norms
should prove helpful to automated technology. First, both personal and
social norms influence which technologies consumers are likely to accept
and adopt. Initiatives to develop and disseminate pro-environmental norms
supporting household smart technology will be a critical aspect of smart
grid's "social marketing." Second, when smart technology requires preference-setting or acquiescence to a computer-generated default, proenvironmental norms encourage consumers to complete (low-cost) preference-setting and increase the likelihood that consumers will input or accept environmentally-beneficial preferences.

relying on consumers to develop and maintain energy-saving habits, and may reduce actual or perceived
sacrifices in lifestyle and comfort . . . .").
87. Even the subsidies for hybrid and electric vehicles, one of the major governmental technology
initiatives for individual households, were quite limited in both funding and duration (and it appears
that a significant portion of the subsidy ended up in the hands of car manufacturers and dealers). See B.
Andrew Chupp et al., The Incidence of Hybrid Automobile Tax Preferences, 38 PUB. FIN. REv. 120,
122, 130 (2010) (describing recent federal tax credits for hybrid car purchases and finding that nearly
half of the subsidy accrues to car sellers because the tax credit is capitalized into higher car prices).

2011]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OFENVIRONAENTAL BEHAVIOR CHANGE

155

III. PARADIGMS OF AUTOMATION: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF SMART
GRID

Smart Grid represents a major advance in bringing sophisticated and
interactive technological automation to the residential consumer. Comprehensive reduction of household electricity usage typically requires repeated
action, on different schedules, aimed at a variety of consumption behaviors
and household appliances. Technology is critical to decreasing emissions
when pro-environmental behavior is demanding and costly. In this Part, I
consider behavioral rationales for funding a full-scale, national smart grid
and discuss how psychological research can inform smart grid design to
maximize energy savings and consumer acceptance.
A.

The Casefor Smart Grid

Moving to a national smart grid is an expensive and resource-intensive
endeavor. To justify such a move on an efficiency basis, the social, private,
and environmental savings must be substantial. This Essay focuses on environmental gains from automation and increased behavioral compliance
(though lower electricity consumption may translate into consumer savings
as well). Specifically, I contend that the psychological barriers to highbehavioral demand electricity conservation argue strongly in favor of a
national smart grid.
Decades of information provision and behavior change initiatives have
made only limited headway in reducing electricity consumption-and those
gains have been virtually obliterated by the proliferation of energy-draining
appliances such as computers and flat-screen televisions. Smart grid dramatically alters the traditional paradigm of energy consumption and household emissions by providing a high-efficiency infrastructure that responds
to behavioral deficits with automation and semi-automation. Smart technology reduces both the information load and behavioral demand on consumers by making energy efficient behavior a one-step "set it and forget it"
process. Thus, smart grid fills gaps in human motivation, knowledge, the
translation of attitudes to actions, and cognitive vigilance. In addition,
unlike informational remedies and social norm interventions, smart grid is
capable of responding quickly to consumption trends or new, energyintensive appliances through master control and targeted on/off cycling.
Policymakers and some scholars have advocated focusing on a few
household energy uses that generate high carbon emissions, which can be
88. See U.S. DEP'TOF ENERGY, supra note 11, at 6.
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reduced at comparatively low behavioral cost. For example, one group of
researchers has characterized certain household conservation practices,
such as the one-time lowering of water heater settings, as "low-hanging
fruit" that produce substantial greenhouse gas savings at minimal individual cost.89 Certainly, there is traction to be gained from targeting the electricity consumption behaviors that are most cost-effective to address.
However, there is potential for much greater energy savings from a comprehensive, smart grid approach that uses advanced technology to prioritize
high-yield conservation measures, while simultaneously addressing other
types of household consumption and transmission losses.
B. PlanningSmart Grid: PrioritizingAutomation
The nation is currently in the planning and pilot stage of smart grid
technology, presenting a window of opportunity to influence the development of smart grid. Based on available and emerging technology, the
future residential smart grid can emphasize sophisticated information provision through real-time pricing and consumption feedback or favor automation and one-time preference-setting or defaults. Focusing solely on
information and pricing would likely decrease consumption more than
traditional initiatives but would fall short of the emissions-reducing potential of automated or semi-automated consumption controls. In this Essay, I
argue that a strong (though not exclusive or unbounded) emphasis on automated technology is critical to the success of a residential smart grid.
Automation responds directly to human deficits in informationprocessing and behavior change. In a sense, automation is the ultimate
"default" and capitalizes on the research demonstrating the carbonreducing efficacy of policies that "nudge"-or in this case more than
nudge-"consumers towards the economically or socially optimal options." 9 1 Smart grid technology can automatically cycle appliances on and
off, shift them into conservation mode, or power appliances down during
peak load times. Rather than requiring individuals to physically adjust appliances periodically, smart grid can deploy household electronics based on
individual consumer profiles or grid needs (presumably subject to consum-

89. See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55
UCLA L. REv. 1701, 1745-50 (2008). The other household energy action characterized as low-hanging
fruit, reducing stand-by energy use by turning appliances on and off or using an automated power strip,
does not in my view meet the definition of low behavioral cost (particularly since automated power
strip technology is still unreliable and difficult to utilize).
90. See Harris,supranote 6.
91. See Carrico et al., supra note 54, at 7.
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er override).92 Smart technologies enable individuals to select one-time
preference-settings for consumption or to utilize preset consumption defaults. Consumption settings ameliorate cognitive errors by limiting the
information the consumer must process (research shows that individuals
can only process four to five pieces of information reliably). 93
When full automation is impracticable or normatively undesirable,
smart technology can employ semi-automation coupled with immediate
feedback and pricing incentives. Here, social and perhaps to a greater extent personal norms can fill the gaps left by partial automation and encourage pro-social behavior.94 Because discrete psychological and norm
initiatives tend to have modest impacts, the most effective strategy for
semi-automation is to combine multiple psychological reinforcers. Thomas
Dietz and his research team note that, "interventions that combine appeals,
information, financial incentives, informal social influences, and efforts to
reduce the transaction costs of taking the desired actions have demonstrated
synergistic effects beyond the additive effects of single policy tools." 95
Similarly, smart grid has much greater potential than traditional initiatives
to decrease electricity use by "layering" multiple interventions from technology, information, financial incentives, and interactive feedback. 96
The move toward technological automation for residential electricity
will require resolving a variety of sticky policy and legal issues. What kind
of technologies should smart grid employ in homes? At what point does
automation impermissibly infringe on individual autonomy and privacy
interests? What are the standards of consent, if any, which consumers must
give to external control of household energy usage? There are legal and
ethical concerns about automating, or semi-automating, areas of traditional
consumer choice and private behavior. Smart technologies gather significant information about household daily life by tracking individual appliances and other electricity consumption. And the ability of smart grid to

92. See supraPart 1.
93. See Viscusi, supra note 51, at 10845.
94. For a discussion of personal norm activation in the context of household toxics, see Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How PersonalNorm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. I101, 1129-1140 (2005).
95. See Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly
Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 106 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'Ls ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 18452,

18453 (2009).
96. For example, one reason the Toyota Prius hybrid car has been successful in reducing consumption is that it offers real-time fuel utilization information, efficiency feedback, high-visibility
design that publicizes the environmental behavior, and financial incentives in the form of gas savings
and other benefits. For a general discussion of the importance of layering interventions, see Psychology
and Global Climate Change, supra note 64, at 148.
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automatically reduce electricity provision or downshift appliances in real
time may strike consumers as intrusive. 97
A substantial amount of smart grid technology is nascent and the legal
framework undeveloped. Accordingly, this Essay raises, but does not resolve, issues of privacy, autonomy, and control. As a general matter, an
effective national smart grid requires households to cede a quantum of their
historical control over electricity consumption. Electricity usage has traditionally been an area of individual sovereignty, limited only by price (or
urgent shortage). But, there is no constitutional or moral rationale for elevating energy usage to the level of an absolutely protected right, particularly given its third-party generation and provision. Certainly, external
restriction of energy is desirable during shortages and emergencies. And,
although the details remain to be worked out, a measure of additional external control or on/off cycling should be acceptable during periods of
normal operation as well.
There are multiple ways that smart grid can limit perceived incursions
on household autonomy and privacy. First, aspects of the technology that
result in third-party control or may otherwise feel intrusive to consumers
can be phased in incrementally. Autonomy and privacy are constructed
socially and interpersonally.98 With gradual exposure to automated technology, norms of "eco-privacy" will likely change over time.99 Second,
smart grid is likely to adopt a model of "soft" control via consumer profiling and default settings subject to consumer override. Presently, most smart
grid plans incorporate individual consent through the consumer setting
initial preferences, voluntarily installing a smart meter or appliance, or
overriding default settings. 0 0
C.

Consumer Adoption and Acceptance

Consumer support is crucial to transition smart grid from the planning
stages to full implementation. Once smart grid is established, consumer
attitudes and willingness to adopt specific technologies will influence the
impact of smart grid: A significant swathe of smart grid technologies requires consumer acquiescence, initial preference-setting, or ongoing inter-

97. See LaMonica, supra note 45, at 3.
98. For a discussion of privacy as control over interpersonal boundaries, see IRWIN ALTMAN, THE
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 6 (1975).

99. There is a voluminous literature on the adoption and diffusion of environmental behavior and
efficiency-enhancing technology. For an overview, see Psychology and Global Climate Change, supra
note 64, at 142-43.
100. See LaMonica, supranote 45, at 2-3.
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active energy utilization management. Consumer marketing research has
found that over seventy percent of consumers would like more information
about their electricity usage and the ability to better control their consumption.101 Yet, consumers are notoriously risk-adverse to change, particularly
if they perceive it as imposing inconvenience or threatening their financial
bottom line.102
Six dimensions predict the diffusion and adoption of new technologies: their compatibility with consumer values, the perceived advantage
over alternatives ("what's in it for me"), the perceived risks of adoption,
the ability to try out products prior to committing, the complexity of products, and their visibility and observability.103 Of these factors, researchers
have found that complexity, observability, and perceptions of the relative
advantages of smart grid for the consumer account for most of the variance
in stated intent to subscribe to smart grid. 104
There are several ways to increase consumer acceptance of smart grid.
First, the development of smart grid technologies should focus on the ease
and simplicity of the user interface through, for example, clear visuals,
intuitive settings, simple steps for inputting preferences, and preprogrammed default settings. Consumers report the strongest willingness to
adopt smart grid when the technology requires two hours or less per year to
set and maintain.10 5 Second, emphasizing the benefits of smart grid, including long-term financial benefits, is critical to its social marketing and
political success. Providing consumers with information about dollars
saved, as well as quantity of emissions avoided, encourages environmentally-friendly preference-setting and maintenance of preset defaults. Last, the
use of pre-implementation pilots, such as recent smart meter installations in
several states, increase observability and thus diminish consumer concerns
about smart electricity technology.

101. See Westervelt, supranote 48, at 1.
102. For example, consumers frequently under-estimate the savings from energy-efficient purchasing decisions. See Carrico et al., supranote 54, at 6.
103. See Richard Feinberg, Achieving Consumer Acceptance of the Smart Grid, THE INTELLIGENT
PROJECT, 3 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://theintelligentproject.org/assets/does/061509_achieving-customeracceptance.pdf.
104. See id. at 7-8.
105. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supranote 11, at 20.
106. In addition, research on social diffusion shows that new practices and technologies spread as
people follow the lead of their friends and neighbors. See Paul C. Stem, What Psychology Knows
About Energy Conservation,47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1224, 1229 (1992).
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CONCLUSION
The focus on individual behavior change, and the comparative neglect
of automated technology, has left gaps in both residential pollution policy
and environmental scholarship. The future of environmental psychology
and law will inevitably intertwine more tightly with technology to focus on
how behavioral research informs technological innovation, consumer preferences, and technology adoption. Residential electricity provision is a paradigm of this trend. Because behavior change is demanding and costly,
automation and technology have key roles to play in electricity conservation. The emerging smart grid represents a fundamental and large-scale
shift away from educational and social norm change initiatives and toward
integrated technology and automation.

